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Abstract: It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem
has also to choose the choice rule itself. In such situation voters’ pref-
erences on alternatives induce preferences over the voting rules. Such a
setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning consis-
tency between these two levels of choice. If a choice rule employed to
resolve the society’s original choice problem does not choose itself when
it is also used in choosing the choice rule, then this phenomenon can be
regarded as inconsistency of this choice rule as it rejects itself according
to its own rationale.
Koray (2000) proved that the only neutral, unanimous universally self-
selective social choice functions are the dictatorial ones. Here we in-
troduce to our society a constitution, which rules out ineﬃcient social
choice rules. When ineﬃcient social choice rules become unavailable for
comparison, the property of self-selectivity becomes weaker and we show
that some non-trivial self-selective social choice functions do exist. Under
certain assumptions on the constitution we describe all of them.
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1 Introduction
It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to choose the choice rule
itself. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning consistency
between these two levels of choice. If a choice rule employed to resolve the society’s
original choice problem does not choose itself when it is also used in choosing the choice
rule, then this phenomenon can be regarded as inconsistency of this choice rule as it
rejects itself according to its own rationale.
This idea of self-selectivity for social choice functions was ﬁrst analyzed by Koray
(2000). Barbera` and Bevia´ (2002) and Barbera` and Jackson (2004) also consider it but
from a diﬀerent perspective. Jackson (2001) in his survey “A crash course on implemen-
tation theory” underlined the importance of the idea.
The diﬃculty of deﬁning such a concept lies in the necessity to construct a proﬁle
on the set of available social choice functions starting from the proﬁle on the existing
alternatives. Koray (2000) resolved this diﬃculty by a clever use of duality which will be
described below.
Let A stand for the set of alternatives, from which the society will be eventually
choosing, and let A stand for the ﬁnite nonempty set of social choice functions (SCFs)
available to this society at the moment of choice, then Koray showed that the society’s
preference proﬁle R on A will induce a “dual” preference proﬁle RA on A. According
to him, it is natural to expect that the agents will rank the SCFs in A in accordance
with what they will choose from A. If each agent’s preferences on A are represented by a
linear order, then the dual preferences on A will be complete preorders since an agent will
be indiﬀerent between two SCFs choosing the same alternative from A. This framework
now allows to apply the consistency test introduced above. If an SCF in A passes this
test, i.e. if it selects itself from A at the dual preference proﬁle RA, then it is called
self-selective at the preference proﬁle R on A relative to A. Moreover, an SCF F is said
to be universally self-selective if it is self-selective at each preference proﬁle on any ﬁnite
nonempty set A relative to any set ﬁnite set A of available SCFs containing F . Koray
(2000) conﬁned itself to neutral SCFs only, so that it was only the size of the alternative
set A that mattered rather than the names of the alternatives in A. The main result in
Koray (2000) is the impossibility theorem stating that a unanimous and neutral SCF is
universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. Koray and Unel (2003) showed
also that impossibility still survives in the tops-only domain. Allowing social choice rules
to be multi-valued also does not lead to any interesting examples and ends up with a
rediscovery of the Condorcet rule as the maximal neutral and self-selective social choice
rule (Koray, 1998).
These theorems showed that the concept of self-selectivity was made too strong to
be useful. In particular, according to the deﬁnition of self-selectivity given above, a self-
selective rule must select itself even when grouped together with most ridiculous rules
which no society will ever contemplate using. Moreover some voting rules are unavailable
to the society on legitimacy grounds. Also, it would be very diﬃcult to argue against the
decision of a society to rule out the usage of ineﬃcient social choice rules.
Since the use of ineﬃcient rules was essential for the proof of Koray’s impossibility
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theorem it has become gradually clear that the sets A cannot be arbitrary. In the present
paper we make an initial attempt to pursue this idea. The main model example that we
have in mind throughout the paper restricts rival SCFs to singleton-valued reﬁnements
of the Pareto correspondence. This special case is of course important in itself, however
we explore self-selectivity in a much broader framework. We introduce a rather large
family of suitable restrictions that yield an interesting class of non-dictatorial self-selective
SCFs (which are not universally self-selective, of course, as the self-selectivity test is
not universal any more). In particular, we show that non-dictatorial self-selectivity is
achievable under eﬃciency.
Each restriction of rival SCFs against which self-selectivity is to be tested in the
present study corresponds to a particular set of norms on the part of the society. We start
with a social choice correspondence π and conﬁne our test functions to singleton-valued
reﬁnements of π. Thus π is to be thought of as a constitutional rule reﬂecting the norms
that the society wishes to adhere to. We assume that the correspondence π is neutral,
tops-inclusive and hereditary. These properties that our constitutional correspondence is
required to possess are all consistent with our conception of social desirability as will be
seen later in the paper.
Moreover, the family of restrictions of test functions via constitutional correspondences
is suﬃciently wide to also include the unrestricted domain as well as the tops-only domain
as its special cases. Thus, we obtain the main results of Koray (2000) and Koray and
Unel (2003) as corollaries to our main result, hence also providing alternative proofs to
those results.
Both Koray (2000) and Koray and Unel (2003) dealt exclusively with neutral SCFs.
Here we show that neutrality is not crucial for self-selectivity results. The notion of self-
selectivity can be extended to the non-neutral case in an easy and natural manner. For
the simplicity of exposition, however, we delegate the non-neutral case to Section 6.
An alternative approach to the “choosing how to choose” problem is pursued by Houy
(2003,2006). He assumes that individuals do not pay attention to immediate consequences
of the choice but form their preferences on the basis of the intrinsic values of the rules
alone: for example some voters might have ethical objections to dictatorship despite the
beneﬁt that it can bring to them personally. This is an important point and in the future
a combined approach might appear.
2 Basic Notions and Examples
Let N stand for a ﬁnite nonempty society of cardinality n which will be ﬁxed throughout
the paper. For each ﬁnite nonempty set A, we denote the set of all linear orders on A
by L(A). Any n-tuple R = (R1, . . . , Rn) of linear orders Ri will be called a proﬁle, and
the set of all proﬁles will be denoted by L(A)n. Denoting, as usual, the set of all positive
integers by N, we set Im = {1, 2, . . . , m} for each m ∈ N. We call a mapping
F :
⋃
m∈N
L(Im)
n → 2N
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a social choice rule (SCR), if and only if, for each m ∈ N and R ∈ L(Im)n, one has
F (R) ⊆ Im. If F (R) is a singleton for each m and R, we refer to the SCR F as a social
choice function (SCF) and write F (R) = a instead of F (R) = {a}. An SCR which is not
an SCF is called a social choice correspondence (SCC).
Before proceeding any further, let us note two aspects in which our deﬁnition of an
SCR diﬀers from the standard one. Firstly, unlike the more common framework, when
the set of alternatives is ﬁxed but the set of voters can vary, we have a ﬁxed set of voters
and variable set of alternatives. This reﬂects the fact that we study how a society chooses
a voting rule. During this process the society is ﬁxed but the exact set of alternatives at
this stage is unknown and cannot be known because the voting rule must be applicable
to all voting situations that might emerge in the future. Thus we consider a sequence of
ﬁnite sets of alternatives I1, I2, . . . , Ik, . . ., rather than a single ﬁxed one. When the choice
problem with m alternatives is deﬁned, the component of the rule that maps L(Im)n into
2Im is used. Most common SCFs can be used for sets of alternatives of variable sizes.
Secondly, the common domain of our SCRs consists of proﬁles on representative sets Im,
one for each cardinality m ∈ N, rather than on arbitrary ﬁnite sets. In the case of a
neutral SCR, this is nothing but a more compact way of describing how the SCR acts on
the proﬁles composed of linear orders on an arbitrary ﬁnite set A. In the ﬁrst four sections
we will restrict ourselves to considering only neutral SCRs. In the last section we show
how the case of non-neytral SCRs can be handled. Finally, the last but not the least, the
concept of self-selectivity can be deﬁned only for a SCF which is capable of choosing an
alternative from sets of alternatives of diﬀerent sizes. Below are several examples of SCfs
and SCCs that satisfy our criteria.
Example 1. Dictatorial and anti-dictatorial SCFs play an important role. They are
deﬁned as follows. For a given proﬁle R,
Di(R) = maxRi,
ADi(R) = minRi,
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. An important SCC, which will later be deﬁned as P , is deﬁned as follows:
for any proﬁle R the set P (R) consists of all Pareto optimal alternatives. Later we will
generalize this example.
Example 2. Let R be a proﬁle. By P (R) we denote the set of all Pareto optimal alter-
natives and by T (R) we the set of all alternatives which are top ranked by at least one
agent.
These two SCCs, denoted P and T , will be important later. Obviously T (R) ⊆ P (R)
for every proﬁle R.
Let us recap what does it mean for SCR to be neutral. For each m ∈ N, let Sm stand
for the symmetric group of all permutations on Im. Given R = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ L(Im)n
and σ ∈ Sm, we deﬁne a new proﬁle Rσ = (Rσ1 , . . . , R
σ
n) such that k R
σ
i  if and only if
4
σ−1(k)Ri σ
−1(), where i ∈ N and k,  ∈ Im. An SCR F is said to be neutral at a proﬁle
R if, for any m ∈ N, R ∈ L(Im)n and σ ∈ Sm
σ(F (Rσ)) = F (R). (1)
An SCR F is said to be neutral if it is neutral at any proﬁle.
In the deﬁnition of a social choice rule it was convenient to use a generic set of alterna-
tives Im. However, in practice we may have to deal with various sets of alternatives, thus
we have to show how to use a SCR F to select from an arbitrary ﬁnite set of alternatives
A given a preference proﬁle on A. The natural way of doing this is, of course, by indexing
the elements of A using the initial segment Im of N with m = |A| and then paying atten-
tion to indices only. This indexation is given by any bijection μ:A→ Im and in practice it
corresponds, to assigning to each candidate their order on a ballot. Given this bijection,
any proﬁle Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn) ∈ L(A)n will induce a proﬁle Qμ = (Q
μ
1 , . . . , Q
μ
n) ∈ L(Im)
n
such that, for any i ∈ N and k,  ∈ Im
k Qμi  ⇐⇒ μ
−1(k)Qi μ
−1(). (2)
We may now deﬁne
F μ(Q) = μ−1(F (Qμ)). (3)
If F is neutral, then it is straightforward to see that F μ = F ν for any two bijections from
A to Im. This means that F treats all candidates equally, regardless of their position on
the ballot. Thus in the neutral case we may assume that F is deﬁned on any ﬁnite set of
alternatives A. It will cause no confusion to write F instead of F μ, when F is neutral.
If we abandon the neutrality assumption, then such a transfer of an SCF F is no longer
uniquely determined, F μ will depend on μ. Hence in this case the set of alternatives must
be indexed. Our main results concerning self-selective SCRs, with appropriate deﬁnition
of self-selectivity, will still hold in the non-neutral case but for the clarity of exposition
and convenience of the reader, we delegate this case to Section 5.
In the sequel we will use the concept of isomorphism for proﬁles which we give in the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1. Let A and B be two equinumerous sets of alternatives, R = (R1, . . . , Rn)
and Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn) be proﬁles on A and B, respectively. Then R and Q are called
isomorphic if there is a bijection σ:A → B such that aRi a′ if and only if σ(a)Qi σ(a′).
The following proposition can now be proved as an easy exercise.
Proposition 1. Let A and B be two equinumerous sets of alternatives, R = (R1, . . . , Rn)
and Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn) be two isomorphic proﬁles on A and B, respectively with σ:A → B
be the corresponding bijection. Then for any neutral SCF F we have σ(F (R)) = F (Q).
Now suppose that the society N , endowed with a preference proﬁle on an m-element
set of alternatives A, from which the choice is to be made, is also to choose an SCF that
will be employed to make its choice from A. Suppose that a nonempty ﬁnite set A of SCFs
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is available to N for this purpose. We assume that the agents in N are only interested
in the outcomes that the SCFs from A will produce and thus rank SCFs accordingly.
Therefore any agent i ∈ N will also have a preference relation RAi on A such that for any
F,G ∈ A
F RAi G ⇐⇒ F (R)Ri G(R). (4)
This preference relation RAi will be a complete preorder and may not be, in general,
antisymmetric. Indeed, two diﬀerent SCFs F,G ∈ A may well choose the same alternative
a ∈ A, in which case the ith agent will be indiﬀerent between F and G. By breaking ties
and introducing linear orders on indiﬀerence classes we may obtain a number of linear
orders compatible with RAi . When we do it for all i ∈ N , we obtain a proﬁle from L(A)
n.
Any proﬁle, so obtained, will be called a proﬁle dual to R on the set of SCFs A. Let us
denote the set of all such proﬁles as L(A, R).
We have now apparatus to formalize the concept of self-selectivity. If A is a ﬁnite set
of SCFs, then we say that F is self-selective at a proﬁle R relative to A if and only if
there exists a dual proﬁle R∗ ∈ L(A ∪ {F}, R) such that F (R∗) = F . We say that F is
self-selective at a proﬁle R if it is self-selective at R relative to every ﬁnite set of SCFs A.
Finally F is said to be universally self-selective if and only if F is self-selective at each
proﬁle R ∈ L(A).
It may be worthwhile to emphasize that in the deﬁnition of self-selectivity of F we
only require that F chooses itself at just one (not all) dual proﬁle. A natural question
arises, what will happen if we require that F selects itself at all dual proﬁles. It is not
diﬃcult to see that this leads to a vacuous concept. Indeed, if we compare F with SCFs
F1, . . . , Fn, which at some proﬁle (unanimous, for example), all select the same winner,
then the set of dual proﬁles will consist of all possible proﬁles and F selects itself at all
of them if and only if it is constant.
Another important thing to note that we are talking about set and not multisets here.
This means in particular that we just cannot repeat F or any other SCF in A several
times. The importance of this will become clear in Section 3.
In other words, universal self-selectivity requires that F passes the self-selectivity test
at each preference proﬁle and against any ﬁnite set of test functions. From Koray (2000)
we know that the only unanimous neutral universally self selective SCFs are the dictatorial
ones. There are two kinds of natural restrictions that one can resort to in an attempt
to avoid this impossibility result. The ﬁrst one is to restrict the domain of preference
proﬁles at which self-selectivity is required. The second is to restrict the class of SCFs
against which the self-selectivity is to be tested. In this study we will be interested in
the latter approach. This interest does not only stem from our intention to escape from
impossibility results but we also believe that this approach is actually consistent with the
realities of a modern society.
Indeed, every society has certain normative criteria according to which the notion of
social acceptability is reﬂected at the constitutional level. This is naturally conﬁnes the
set of SCFs that may be used by that society, from the very outset, to a certain subclass
of all SCFs, ruling out all other SCFs as socially unacceptable. We would ﬁnd it very
diﬃcult on our part to argue, for example, against the decision of a society to adopt Pareto
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eﬃciency as a constitutional principle and thus restrict itself to using eﬃcient SCFs only.
In this case the set of acceptable SCFs would consist of all singleton-valued reﬁnements
of the Pareto correspondence. For such a society it will be natural to test self-selectivity
of an SCF against Paretian SCFs only.
Let F be a nonempty set of neutral SCFs which will be used to denote the set of test
functions for self-selectivity. We say that F is F-self-selective at a proﬁle R ∈ L(A)n if
and only if F is self-selective at R relative to A ∪ {F} for any ﬁnite subset A of F . We
say that F is F -self-selective if it is F-self-selective at any proﬁle R. We illustrate the
concept with the following three examples.
Example 3. Let Q = (Q1, . . . , Q19) be the following proﬁle:
Q1 −Q4 Q5 −Q8 Q9 −Q13 Q14 −Q19
a b c d
c a a b
b c b a
d d d c
Let B be the Borda rule, C be any Condorcet consistent rule, E be the Plurality rule, and
R be the Runn-oﬀ rule. Then B(Q) = a, C(Q) = b, R(Q) = c, E(Q) = d. The same
voters will rank the rules in the dual proﬁle Q as follows:
Q∗1 −Q
∗
4 Q
∗
5 −Q
∗
8 Q
∗
9 −Q
∗
13 Q
∗
14 −Q
∗
19
B C R E
R B B C
C R C B
E E E R
We see that B(Q) = B, C(Q) = C, R(Q) = R, P (Q) = P . Each rule is self-selective
at Q.
Example 4. Any dictatorial or anti-dictatorial SCF is universally self-selective.
Finally, we give an example when the Borda rule is not self-selective.
Example 5. Let D = {D1, . . . , Dn} be the class of all dictatorial SCFs. Then it is easy to
see that the Borda count is not D-self-selective. To illustrate this let us denote the Borda
count as B and check that B does not choose itself from {B,D1} at the proﬁle
R1 R2 R3
a a e
b b b
c c c
d d d
e e a
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Here D1 chooses a and the Borda count chooses b. The unique dual proﬁle on {B,D1}
will be
R1 R

2 R

3
D1 D1 B
B B D1
where Borda will choose D1.
In this study the notion of social acceptability at the constitutional level will be rep-
resented via a neutral SCC π. Once the society chooses such a constitutional correspon-
dence, the set F of its admissible SCFs will be restricted to singleton-valued reﬁnements
of π. We will refer to such SCFs as to selections of π. We also wish to secure that F
fully reﬂects π in the sense that there is no smaller constitution that F is consistent with.
Formally, we require that for every proﬁle R⋃
F∈F
F (R) = π(R) (5)
at each proﬁle R, in which case we say that F is π-complete.
To illustrate this concept with the following example.
Example 6. Let D = {D1, . . . , Dn} be the class of all dictatorial SCFs. Then D is
T -complete. D will not be P -complete though since it is possible that a Pareto-optimal
alternative is not anybody’s ﬁrst preference.
Now let us turn our attention to the properties that the correspondence π is expected
to possess. This correspondence should be both suﬃciently restrictive and suﬃciently
ﬂexible. It is to be restrictive to reﬂect certain normative criteria. If π is the universal
correspondence, which we denote Ω, i.e. π(R) = A for every set of alternatives A and
every proﬁle R ∈ L(A)n, then π is vacuous from the normative veiwpoint. On the other
hand, π should be suﬃciently ﬂexible as it is meant to be a rule at the constitutional
level. If π itself is always singleton-valued, then π itself would be the only admissible
SCF available to the society to resolve any choice problem whatsoever. Moreover, if a
constitution is to respect preferences of individuals, then it does not seem too-far-fetched
to require that there should be no agent whose best outcome is constitutionally ruled out
at some preference proﬁle. This means that π(R) should contain all top-ranked outcomes
at any proﬁle R. This leads to the requirement that π must be tops-inclusive i.e., the
inclusion T (R) ⊆ π(R) must hold. We also require one additional condition which will be
discussed in Section 4.
We will also require that our constitutional correspondence behave consistently under
restrictions of preference proﬁles to subsets of alternatives chosen by it. More speciﬁcally,
we will say that an SCC π is hereditary if and only if for every proﬁle R and every
nonempty subset ∅ 
= X ⊆ π(R) there holds π(R|X) = X, where R|X is the restriction of
the proﬁle R to the set of alternatives X. This requirement is very natural. Indeed, if an
alternative was eligible for choice for the society at an early stages of selection, and then
other alternatives were eliminated, then that particular alternative should remain eligible
for choice.
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In the sequel, we assume that our constitutional correspondence π is tops-inclusive and
hereditary. We note that our “role models” P , T , and Ω all satisfy these requirements.
The collection F of all admissible under π social choice test-functions will be always
assumed π-complete.
We note that, when π = Ω and F is the set of all selections of Ω we obtain the
framework studied by Koray (2000) and his main result as a corollary. Similarly taking
π = T and F to be the set of all selections of T , we obtain the framework of the paper
by Koray and Unel (2003) and their main result as a corollary too.
Let us also deﬁne some more SCCs which will play some role in the rest of the paper.
Firstly, we remind to the reader that the upper contour set U(a, L) of an alternative a
relative to a linear order L is deﬁned as U(a, L) = {x ∈ A | xLa}.
Let q ≥ 1 be a positive integer and R = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ L(A)n be a proﬁle. An
alternative a ∈ A is said to be q-Pareto optimal if
card
(
n⋂
i=1
U(a,Ri)
)
≤ q.
In particular, for q = 1 we note that 1-Pareto optimal elements are the classical Pareto
optimal ones, i.e., P1(R) = P (R). Let Pq(R) be the set of all q-Pareto optimal elements
of R. An alternative a ∈ A is said to get at least one qth degree approval if
n
min
i=1
card (U(a,Ri)) ≤ q.
Let Tq(R) be the set of all alternatives which got at least one qth degree approval. In
particular, T1(R) is the set of elements who ranked ﬁrst by at least one agent, thus
T1(R) = T (R). Obviously,
T1(R) ⊆ T2(R) ⊆ . . . ⊆ Tk(R) ⊆ . . .
We note also that Tq(R) ⊆ Pq(R).
3 Self-selectivity and resistance to cloning
Here we will show that self-selectivity is closely related with two other properties of SCFs
that often appear in the literature: resistance to cloning alternatives and Arrow’s choice
axiom. The resistance to cloning alternatives is one of the many forms of manipulation
that exists [12, 14, 16]. For example, producing a clone of a leading candidate in the race
splits her vote and may allow the second candidate in the race to win the election. We
treat cloning in generalised terms. In particular, withdrawal of a candidate from the race
may also change the outcome of the election and this move can also be manipulative (see,
e.g. [13]). We treat withdrawals as a particular type of cloning when an alternative is
replaced with zero clones.
Let us describe the cloning procedure formally. Let R be a proﬁle on a set of al-
ternatives A = {a1, . . . , ak}. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k we introduce the set of alternatives
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A′i which is either empty or A
′
i = {ai1, ai2, . . . , aiki} with ki ≥ 1 and ai = ai1. We set
A′ = A′1 ∪ . . . ∪ A
′
k. In the proﬁle R we drop all alternatives ai, for which A
′
i = ∅ and
replace each alternative ai, for which A
′
i is non-empty, with a linear order on A
′
i (not
necessarily the same for diﬀerent occurrences of ai) and this gives us a proﬁle R
′ on the
set of alternatives A′ which we will call a cloned proﬁle. We emphasise the following two
features of any cloned proﬁle: in each linear order of R′ all clones of the same alternative
are standing “together” but the order on these clones may be diﬀerent from one linear
order of R′ to another. Another important thing to note is that a subset of A is contained
in A′; this is the set of alternatives which have not been “withdrawn”. The possibility to
withdraw an alternative is absent in the deﬁnitions of cloning used in [12, 14, 16].
Deﬁnition 2. Let R be a proﬁle on a set of alternatives A = {a1, . . . , ak} and C be an
SCC. We say that C is resistant to cloning of essential alternatives at a proﬁle R if for
any cloned set of alternatives A′ = A′1 ∪ . . . ∪ A
′
k, where ai /∈ C(R) implies A
′
i = ∅, there
exists a cloned proﬁle R′ on A′ at which
C(R) ∩A′ = C(R′). (6)
We say that an SCC C is resistant to cloning of essential alternatives if it is resistant to
cloning of essential alternatives at any proﬁle R.
As in the case of self-selectivity, it is important to note that we require the existence
of just one cloned proﬁle R′ with the property (6). Asking for all proﬁles to satisfy this
condition makes the concept vacuous again.
It may be worthwhile to note that (6) represents a weak version of Arrow’s choice
axiom [2] which he proved to be equivalent to a rationalisability of the SCC C by a social
welfare function.
Example 7. Already mentioned SCCs T , P and Ω are resistant to cloning of essential
alternatives.
Proof. Suppose that a ∈ T (R). Then a = maxRi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let a = aj .
Suppose A′j is not empty and therefore includes a. We order all elements of A
′
j so that
a = aj = aj1 is on the top of A
′
j . Let R
′ be any cloned proﬁle where this order on A′j is
chosen. Then a will be on the top of R′i, hence a ∈ T (R
′). On the other hand no other
element of A′j will be on the top of any R
′
j since it a majorises it in every R
′
j . Thus (6)
is satisﬁed for T .
The proof for P is similar and the resistant to cloning of essential alternatives for Ω
is obvious.
Proposition 2. Any SCC which is resistant to cloning of essential alternatives is hered-
itary.
Proof. Let C be a clone resistant SCC, R be a proﬁle on A = {a1, . . . , ak}, and let
X ⊆ C(R). Suppose without loss of generality that X = {a1, . . . , aq} for q ≤ k. Then
the restriction R|X of R onto the set of alternatives X is a cloned proﬁle on A′, where
|A′1| = . . . = |A
′
q| = 1 and |A
′
q+1| = . . . = |A
′
k| = 0, and the proposition follows.
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An important link between self-selectivity and resistant to cloning of essential alter-
natives is presented in the following theorem which will give us a non-trivial example of
self-selective SCFs.
Theorem 1. Let π be any neutral SCC which is resistant to cloning of essential alter-
natives and F be any class of SCFs, each of which is a selection of π. Then for each
1 ≤ i ≤ n the two SCF given by
F (R) = minRi |π(R), G(R) = maxRi |π(R) (7)
are F-self-selective.
Proof. We will prove the statement only for the ﬁrst function. The proof for the second
function is similar. Let R be a proﬁle on a set of alternatives A = {a1, . . . , am} and A =
{F1, . . . , Fk} ⊆ F be any ﬁnite subset of F not containing F . Let us also denote F0 = F .
Suppose Fj(R) = aj , where j = 0, 1, . . . , k and some aj ’s may coincide. Without loss of
generality we may assume that a0, a1, . . . , ap are distinct and that aq ∈ {a0, a1, . . . , ap} for
all q > p. Let F j be the set of all SCFs from {F0}∪A which select aj for all j = 1, . . . , p.
Note that F = F0 ∈ F0. By their deﬁnition all F j’s for j = 1, . . . , p are non-empty, let
us denote the elements of F j as Fj1, Fj2, . . . , Fjkj with Fj = Fj1.
Let B = {a0, a1, . . . , ap}. Since every SCF from A is a selection of π, we note that
B ⊆ π(R). To construct a dual proﬁle R∗, ﬁrstly, we have to restrict R to the set B,
then to change aj ∈ B into F j , treating F j as equivalence classes, and then to break ties
selecting linear orders on each F j (which may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent linear orders of R∗).
Instead, we will consider a cloned proﬁle isomorphic to R∗. We set A′j = {aj1, aj2, . . . , ajkj}
for j = 0, 1, . . . , p and A′q = ∅ for p < q ≤ m. Let R
′ be the resulting cloned proﬁle on
A′ = A′1 ∪ . . . ∪A
′
m. By resistance to cloning B ⊆ π(R
′) and hence {F0} ∪ A ⊆ π(R∗).
Let R¯ be the restriction of R onto B. We note that by its deﬁnition a0 = min R¯i. As
B ⊆ π(R), by resistance to cloning of essential alternatives a0 = a01 is the only element
of π(R′) among elements of A′0 = {a01, a02, . . . , a0k0}. Hence in the cloned proﬁle R
′ the
element a0 is the worst element of π(R
′) in R′i. Hence F (R
′) = a0 and F (R
∗) = F0 = F .
Hence F chooses itself at R∗.
The SCFs introduced in Theorem 1 will be called π-antidictatorship and π-dictatorship
of the ith voter, respectively. A certain degree of clone resistance of π is necessary for
this theorem to be true. We illustrate this in the following example.
Example 8. Let us consider the following proﬁle R = (R1, R2, R3):
R1 R2 R3
a b b
c a a
d d d
b c c
and let π = T2.Then a = B(R) is the Borda winner and b = E(R) is the Plurality
winner, and π(R) = {a, b, c}. Let D1 be the dictatorship of the ﬁrst voter and F be the
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π-antidictatorship of the second voter. Then there are eight dual proﬁles (one of which
R∗ is shown below)
R∗1 R
∗
2 R
∗
3
B E E
D1 D1 D1
F B B
E F F
None of the eight dual proﬁles have F ∈ T2(R
∗), hence F is not self-selective at R relative
to F = {B,D1, E} or any larger set of SCFs.
We see that it is exactly the failure of clone resistance that leads to the failure of F to
be self-selective. It is easy to construct examples which show that the π-antidictatorship
is not self-selective for π = Tq, when q > 2, and for π = Pq, when q ≥ 2.
4 The Main Theorem
In Theorem 1 we introduced the π-antidictatorship and π-dictatorship, respectively. The
π-dictatorship is not very interesting since for any tops-inclusive SCC π it will give us the
ordinary dictatorship. Not so with the π-antidictatorship. One of the most interesting
SCFs of this kind is the SCF given by
F (R) = minRi |P (R),
i.e. Pareto antidictatorship. This SCF chooses the worst Pareto optimal alternative for
the ith voter. So the ith voter is a Pareto anti-dictator.
Unlike the standard anti-dictatorial SCFs, the π-antidictatorship constitutes a rather
complex arrangement made by the society in such a way that the choice is always eﬃcient,
depends on the opinion of all agents, not just one, and does not give anybody an unfair
advantage.
Now we discuss the condition of tops-inclusiveness in detail. We say that π is tops-
inclusive if and only if the following two conditions hold:
(i) T (R) ⊆ π(R) for every proﬁle R.
(ii) If π(R) ⊆ P (R) does not hold for at least one proﬁle R ∈ L(A)n, then π(R) ⊇ T2(R)
for every proﬁle R ∈ L(A)n.
We have already discussed condition (i) above. As for condition (ii), it looks like
a technical condition that we need for our results to hold. However, it does have a
simple meaning based on the notions of eﬃciency and fairness at the constitutional level.
Before the discussion of its meaning, let us note that in this study we regard the Pareto
correspondence as our primary “role model” for the constitutional correspondence π. And,
as long as π is Paretian, condition (ii) is vacuous and may be forgotten. However, if π
includes not only all Pareto optimal alternatives but also at least one a ∈ π(R), which is
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not Pareto optimal, then it is not top-ranked by any of the agents at R. If some agent’s
kth ranked alternative, with k ≥ 2, is included in π(R) although it is not eﬃcient, then
one could argue on the grounds of fairness that no alternative that is ranked kth or higher
should be excluded from π(R), i.e. the inclusion Tk(R) ⊆ π(R) must hold. Condition (ii)
is the weakest of this kind and, as long as the correspondence π satisﬁes the two conditions
we do not want to complicate the matter any further.
The main result of this paper presented in a theorem below states that π-antidictator-
ships are eﬀectively the only non-trivial examples of self-selective SCFs if we restrict the
set of rival SCFs to selections of π.
Theorem 2. Suppose n ≥ 3. Let π be any neutral, hereditary and tops-inclusive SCC
and F be a selection of π which is F-self-selective for some π-complete set F of SCFs.
Then either F is dictatorial or π-antidictatorial.
We will give a proof in the next section. Now we are going to single out some interesting
cases which fall under this general result.
Corollary 1. Let F be a universally self-selective SCF. Then it is dictatorial or antidic-
tatorial.
This generalises the main result of Koray (2000), where unanimity was assumed which
precluded antidictatorial SCFs from being a possibility. We obtain this corollary assuming
π = Ω. Another consequence of the main result follows from Theorem 1:
Corollary 2. Let F be a clone resistant SCF. Then it is dictatorial or antidictatorial.
Corollary 3. Let F be a selection of T . Let D = {D1, . . . , Dn} be the set of all dictatorial
SCFs and F is any set of SCFs containing D. Then F is F-self-selective if and only if it
is dictatorial or T -antidictatorial.
This generalises the main result of Koray and Unel (2003) in several directions. We
obtain their result by setting π = T .
Corollary 4. Let F be a selection of P . Let F be any set of SCFs which is P -complete.
Then F is F-self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial or P -antidictatorial.
Finally, we will mention several of SCCs for which dictatorial SCFs are still the only
self-selective SCFs even if unanimity is not postulated.
Corollary 5. Let n ≥ 3 and let π be either Tq or Pq, where q ≥ 2, and F be a selection
of π which is F-self-selective for some π-complete set F of SCFs. Then F is dictatorial.
Proof. Since π is neutral, tops-inclusive and hereditary, by Theorem 2 F is either dictato-
rial or π-antidictatorial. But as we have seen for Tq or Pq, where q ≥ 2, π-antidictatorial
SCFs are not self-selective.
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5 Proof of Theorem 2
In this section we assume that all conditions of Theorem 2 hold. Let R be a proﬁle. The
alternatives in π(R) will be called π-optimal relative to R. By π−(R) we will denote the
set of all remaining alternatives (which are not thus π-optimal). The following key lemma
relates the condition of F -self-selectivity with the more familiar conceptual framework of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
Lemma 1. Let R ∈ L(Im)n be a proﬁle, and F be an SCF which is F-self-selective at R.
Let B be a subset of Im such that π
−(R) ⊆ B ⊆ Im, and C = Im \B. Then
(F (R) ∈ C) =⇒ (F (R) = F (R|C)). (8)
Proof. Let the cardinality of C be k. Suppose F (R) ∈ C. Note that all elements in C
are π-optimal, hence k ≥ 1 as π is tops-inclusive. Since F is π-complete, there exists a
subset G ⊆ F of cardinality k such that F ∈ G and for every a ∈ C there exists an SCF
G ∈ G such that G(R) = a. Let μ:G → C be a bijection such that μ(G) = G(R).
Let S = R|C be the restriction of R onto C. Then, using the mapping μ−1, as in (2)
we can induce a proﬁle Sμ
−1
on G. Note that Sμ
−1
coincides with the unique dual proﬁle
SG as deﬁned in (4). Thus, by F -self-selectivity of F , we have
F (Sμ
−1
) = F (SG) = F.
Having the deﬁnition of μ in mind, and (3) we obtain
F (R) = μ(F ) = μF (Sμ
−1
) = F μ(S).
Due to neutrality of F we have F (R) = F (S), as required.
We will call the condition (8) the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with respect
to π. We will omit π, if this invites no confusion.
Corollary 6. Let R ∈ L(Im)
n be a proﬁle and F be a selection of π which satisﬁes the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Then
F (R) = F (R|π(R)).
Proof. Since F is a selection of π, F (R) /∈ π−(R). By the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives
F (R) = F (R|Im\π−(R)) = F (R|π(R)), (9)
as required.
Let F be an SCF and let R be a proﬁle. Then for X ⊆ π(R) we deﬁne
cR(X)
def
= F (R|X),
and for every x, y ∈ π(R)
x R y
def
⇐⇒ cR({x, y}) = x.
By doing this, we attach to every SCF F and every proﬁle R a binary relation R on
π(R).
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Lemma 2. Let F be an SCF satisfying the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Then
for every proﬁle R the restriction of the binary relation R to π(R) is a linear order on
π(R).
Proof. Suppose x R y and y R z, where x, y, z ∈ π(R) are distinct. Then x, y, z ∈
π(R|{x,y,z}) since π is hereditary. Let us prove that cR({x, y, z}) = x. Indeed, if cR({x, y, z}) =
z, then the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies cR({y, z}) = z which contra-
dicts to y R z. If cR({x, y, z}) = y, then the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
implies cR({x, y}) = y which contradicts to x R y. Hence cR({x, y, z}) = x is proven and
then by the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives we get cR({x, z}) = x, i.e. x R z.
The following proposition reveals the mechanism behind any SCF which is a selection
of π and satisﬁes the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. It can be viewed as an
extension of Corollary 6.
Proposition 3. Let F be a selection of π satisfying the Independence of Irrelevant Al-
ternatives. Let R be a proﬁle. Suppose that the elements of π(R) are enumerated so that
π(R) = {b1, . . . , br} with
b1 R b2 R . . . R br.
Then F (R) = cR({b1, . . . , br}) = b1.
Proof. The equality F (R) = cR({b1, . . . , br}) is implied by Corollary 6. Let us prove
cR({b1, . . . , bk}) = b1 by induction on k. If k = 2, then cR({b1, b2}) = b1 is equiv-
alent to b1 R b2. Suppose that cR({b1, . . . , bk}) = b1, let us consider b1, . . . , bk+1.
If cR({b1, . . . , bk+1}) = bk+1, then the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies
bk+1 R bk, the contradiction. Then cR({b1, . . . , bk+1}) ∈ {b1, . . . , bk}. Then by the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
cR({b1, . . . , bk+1}) = cR({b1, . . . , bk}) = b1.
The proposition is proved.
We will denote the ith voter as i so that N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. It will not lead to a
confusion. We ﬁx π till the end of this section. In the rest of the proof we follow the ideas
of the original proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (1951,1963). The proof itself is
diﬀerent since here we have transitivity only on a variable set of alternatives π(R) which
depends on the proﬁle R. We have to be careful about that.
Deﬁnition 3. Let F be an SCF. We say that a coalition D ⊆ N is π-decisive for F
and a pair (a, b) of distinct alternatives a, b ∈ Im, if for an arbitrary proﬁle R, such that
a, b ∈ π(R), aRib for i ∈ D, and bRja for j ∈ N \ D, imply a R b. We say that D is
π-decisive for F , if it is π-decisive for every pair of distinct alternatives.
Most of the time our π will be ﬁxed and we will write decisive instead of π-decisive.
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Lemma 3. Let F be an SCF satisfying the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and
let D be a coalition. Suppose that there exists a proﬁle R, such that for some a, b ∈ π(R),
aRib for i ∈ D, and bRja for j ∈ N \ D, and a R b. Then D is decisive for F and the
pair (a, b). If the coalition D is proper, i.e ∅ 
= D 
= N , then the reverse is also true.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a proﬁle R, such that a, b ∈ π(R), aRib for i ∈ D, and
bRja for j ∈ N \ D, and a R b. Let R′ be any proﬁle with a, b ∈ π(R′) such that
a, b ∈ π(R′), aR′ib for i ∈ D, and bR
′
ja for j ∈ N \ D. Then R
′|{a,b} = R|{a,b}, whence
F (R′|{a,b}) = F (R|{a,b}) = a, and a R′ b.
Suppose now that a proper coalition D is decisive for F and a pair (a, b).Then both
D and N \ D are nonempty. Let us consider any proﬁle R of the following type:
a  b  . . . : agents from D,
b  a  . . . : agent from N \ D.
Then a, b ∈ π(R), since π is tops-inclusive, and hence a R b by the decisiveness of D.
Therefore a proﬁle with the required properties exists.
We illustrate this Lemma by the following
Example 9. Let π = T and D = N . Then the statement a, b ∈ π(R) and aRib for all
i ∈ D is false and trivially implies a R b. Thus D will be decisive for F .
Lemma 4. Let F be an SCF satisfying the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Then
a coalition D is decisive for F if and only if it is decisive for F and a pair (a, b) for some
distinct alternatives a, b ∈ Im.
Proof. Suppose D is decisive for F and a pair (a, b) of distinct alternatives a, b ∈ Im.
First, we suppose that there exists a proﬁle R, such that a, b ∈ π(R), aRib for i ∈ D, and
bRja for j ∈ N \ D, with a R b. By the deﬁnition the latter means that a = F (R|{a,b}).
Let us denote R|{a,b} = P .
Let us consider any proﬁle R′ such that c, d ∈ π(R′), cR′id for i ∈ D, and dR
′
jc for
j ∈ N \ D. Let us denote R′|{c,d} = Q. Consider the bijections μ: {a, b} → I2 and
ν: {c, d} → I2 such that μ(a) = ν(c) = 1 and μ(b) = ν(d) = 2. By (3)
a = F (P ) = F μ(P ) = μ−1F (P μ).
Since the proﬁles P μ and Qν coincide, we have
F (Q) = F ν(Q) = ν−1F (Qν) = c.
The latter means c R′ d and by Lemma 4 D is decisive for (c, d).
Let us consider the remaining case, when no proﬁles exist such that a, b ∈ π(R), aRib
for i ∈ D, and bRja for j ∈ N \D. The neutrality of π then implies that no proﬁle Q can
exist such that c, d ∈ π(Q), cQid for i ∈ D, and dQjc for j ∈ N \D. Thus, in both cases,
D is decisive for F .
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Corollary 7. Let F be an SCF satisfying the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
Let D be a proper subset of N . Then either D is decisive or its complement N \ D is
decisive.
Proof. Suppose that a coalition D is decisive for F and a pair (a, b). Then D is decisive
by Lemma 4. If D is not decisive for F and a pair (a, b), then there exists a proﬁle R such
that a, b ∈ π(R), and aRib for i ∈ D, and bRja for j ∈ N \ D, but b R a. But now by
Lemmata 3 and 4 N \ D is decisive.
The following Lemmata on the structure of the set of decisive subsets of N will be
proved under the assumption that F is a SCF which satisﬁes the Independence of Irrele-
vant Alternatives, where π is a neutral, hereditary, and tops-inclusive SCC.
Lemma 5. If a decisive set D = D1∪D2, diﬀerent from N , is a disjoint union (D1∩D2 =
∅) of two nonempty subsets D1 and D2, then either D1 or D2 is decisive as well.
Proof. Let N = D1 ∪D2 ∪M, where M = N \D 
= ∅. Consider any proﬁle R such that
for some a, b, c ∈ Im:
a  b  c  . . . : agents from D1,
b  c  a  . . . : agents from D2,
c  a  b  . . . : agents from M.
Then a, b, c ∈ π(R) as π is tops-inclusive. Then b R c as D = D1 ∪ D2 is decisive. If
b R a then D2 is decisive and the result is proved. If not, then a R b. Since by Lemma 3
the relation R is transitive on π(R), a R b and b R c imply a R c, which means that
in this case D1 is decisive.
Lemma 6. There exists a singleton v ∈ N such that {v} is decisive.
Proof. Let N ′ = N \ {u}, where u ∈ N is arbitrary. Then by Corollary 7 either {u} or
N ′ is decisive. In the ﬁrst case we are done. In the second, we may repeatedly apply
Lemma 5 to N ′ and then to its decisive subsets until a decisive singleton is obtained.
Lemma 7. Let D1, D2 and D3 be three nonempty disjoint subsets of N such that N =
D1 ∪ D2 ∪ D3. Then all three subsets cannot be simultaneously decisive.
Proof. If this were possible, then consider the following proﬁle R:
a  b  c  . . . : agents from D1,
b  c  a  . . . : agents from D2,
c  a  b  . . . : agents from D3.
Since π is tops-inclusive, the alternatives a, b, c are all π-optimal and, assuming that all
three subsets are decisive, we will have a R c R b R a, which contradicts to the
transitivity of R on π(R) proved in Lemma 3.
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Lemma 8. Let D1 and D2 be two decisive subsets of N such that D1 ∪ D2 
= N . Then
the union D1 ∪ D2 is decisive.
Proof. Suppose ﬁrst that D1 and D2 are disjoint. As D1 ∪D2 
= N , then M = N \ (D1 ∪
D2) 
= ∅. By Lemma 7 M is not decisive. But then D1 ∪ D2 = N \M is decisive by
Corollary 7.
Now let us assume that D1 and D2 have a nonzero intersection. We may also assume
that this intersection is diﬀerent from both of the sets because otherwise the result is
trivial. Let us consider any proﬁle such that for some alternatives a, b, c ∈ Im
a  b  c  . . . : agents from D1 ∩ D2,
a  c  b  . . . : agents from D1 \ D2,
b  a  c  . . . : agents from D2 \ D1,
c  b  a  . . . : agents from M,
where M = N \ (D1 ∪ D2). We note that a, b, c ∈ π(R) as π is tops-inclusive. Then
a R b since D1 is decisive and b R c since D2 is decisive. By transitivity of R on π(R)
we get a R c and hence D1 ∪ D2 is decisive.
Corollary 8. There exists a decisive subset D of N of cardinality n− 1.
Proof. This is the same to say that one of the singletons is not decisive. Suppose to the
contrary that all singletons are decisive. Then by Lemma 8 all proper subsets of N are
decisive. This is impossible since by Corollary 7 a subset and its complement cannot be
simultaneously decisive.
Lemma 9. Let ∅ 
= D1 ⊆ D ⊆ D2 
= N with D1 and D2 being decisive. Then D is
decisive.
Proof. Let us consider any proﬁle such that for some alternatives a, b, c ∈ Im
a  b  c  . . . : agents from D1,
b  a  c  . . . : agents from D \ D1,
b  c  a  . . . : agents from D2 \ D,
c  b  a  . . . : agents from N \ D2.
Since a, b, c ∈ π(R), we get a R b as D1 is decisive and b R c as D2 is decisive. By the
transitivity of R on π(R) we get a R c which means that D is decisive.
Deﬁnition 4. Let F be an SCF. An agent k ∈ N will be called an π-dictator, if for every
proﬁle R and for every pair of two distinct alternatives a, b ∈ π(R) it is true that aRkb
implies a R b; an agent k ∈ N will be called an π-antidictator, if for every proﬁle R and
for every pair of two distinct alternatives a, b with a, b ∈ π(R) it is true that aRkb implies
b R a.
The following two propositions are obvious.
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Proposition 4. An agent k ∈ N is an π-dictator, if all coalitions in N containing k are
π-decisive. An agent k ∈ N is an π-antidictator, if all coalitions in N not containing k
(including the empty one) are π-decisive.
Now we are ready to prove the main results of this paper.
Proof of Theorem 2. We will prove that there is either a π-dictator or π-antidictator.
Since F is a selection from π an π-dictator will be an ordinary dictator.
Firstly, we note that the existence of a decisive set of cardinality n− 1 is guaranteed
by Corollary 8. Without loss of generality, we assume that D = {1, . . . , n−1} is decisive.
By Lemma 6 there is a decisive singleton in D; and we may assume that it is {1}. By
Lemma 9 all subsets of D, which contain {1}, are decisive.
Now the key question is whether or not one of the subsets N \ {i} is decisive for
2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Let us assume ﬁrst that there is such a subset, say N \ {i}. Then every
proper subset of N , containing 1 is contained in either N \{n} or N \{i} and by Lemma 9
is decisive. Hence all proper subsets containing {1} are decisive. It remains to prove that
in this case N itself is also decisive, it would mean that agent 1 is an π-dictator.
We note ﬁrst that if π(R) ⊆ P (R) for all proﬁles R, then N is trivially decisive because
there does not exist such a, b ∈ π(R) that aRib for all i ∈ N . If this inclusion does not
hold, then by the second condition of tops-inclusiveness π(R) contains all ﬁrst and second
preferences. Let us consider any proﬁle of the following type
a  b  c  . . . : agents from N \ {2, 3}
b  a  c  . . . : agent 2,
a  c  b  . . . : agent 3.
Then a, b, c ∈ π(R) as π(R) contains all ﬁrst and second preferences. We get a R b as
N \{2} is decisive and b R c as N \{3} is decisive. By transitivity we get a R c which
by Lemma 4 means that N is decisive. Thus agent 1 is an π-dictator.
Suppose now that none of the subsets N \ {i} are decisive for 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. This
immediately implies that all agents 2, 3, . . . , n−1 are decisive. Now by Lemma 8 it follows
that every nonempty subset of D is decisive. Then n would be an π-antidictator if and
only if an empty set is decisive.
We note ﬁrst that if π(R) ⊆ P (R) for all proﬁles R, then ∅ is trivially decisive. If not,
then π(R) contains all second preferences. Let us consider any proﬁle of the following
type
a  b  c  . . . : agents from N \ {n−1, n−2}
b  a  c  . . . : agent n−1,
a  c  b  . . . : agent n−2.
Then a, b, c ∈ π(R) as π(R) contains all ﬁrst and second preferences. We get b R a as
{n−1} is decisive and c R b as {n−2} is decisive. By transitivity we get c R a which
by Lemma 4 means that ∅ is decisive. Thus agent n is an π-antidictator.
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6 Theorem 2 without neutrality
As we mentioned above, here we have to work with indexed sets of alternatives. Instead
of a set of alternative A we must consider this set A together with positions of those
alternatives on the ballot. If m is the cardinality of A, then the order on the ballot is
given by a bijection μ:A → Im. Then, given a SCF F we may deﬁne a SCF F μ on A by
the formula (3) but this now becomes dependent on μ. The deﬁnition of self-selectivity
has to be amended accordingly.
Deﬁnition 5. An SCF F is said to be F-self-selective at a proﬁle R ∈ L(Im)n if, for
any ﬁnite set of SCFs F ′ ⊆ F , there exists at least one dual proﬁle R∗ on G = {F} ∪ F ′
such that for every bijection ν:G → Ik, where k is the cardinality of G, the SCF F ν,
being applied to R∗, chooses F , i.e., F ν(R∗) = F for all ν. An SCF F is said to be
F-self-selective if it is F-self-selective at every proﬁle.
Lemma 1 has to be slightly modiﬁed too.
Lemma 10. Let π be an SCC and let R ∈ L(Im)n be a proﬁle. Let F be an SCF
which is F-self-selective at R. Let B be a subset of Im of cardinality m − k such that
π−(R) ⊆ B ⊆ Im. Let C = Im \B. Then for every bijection ν:C → Ik
(F (R) ∈ C) =⇒ (F (R) = F ν(R|C)). (10)
In particular, F is neutral at R|C.
Proof. Is very similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
The formulation of the main theorem is not aﬀected. Once we obtained the restricted
neutrality in Lemma 10 the rest of the proof of the main theorem is without changes.
7 Conclusion and Further Research
In this paper the authors have made the ﬁrst attempt to ﬁnd a framework in which
non-dictatorial self-selective SCFs may exist. To this end we relaxed the universal self-
selectivity restricting the set of rival SCFs requiring them to be ’reasonable’ in the sense
that they are selections from a certain well-behaved constitutional correspondence. We
indeed discovered some self-selective non-dictatorial SCFs. Further attempts to ﬁnd in-
teresting relaxations of universal self-selectivity are encouraged.
We showed that the property of self-selectivity is closely related to some well-known
and well-studied properties of SCFs such that independence of irrelevant alternatives,
resistance to cloning. But, unlike them, self-selectivity can be made rather ﬂexible since
the choice of the set of rival SCFs F can be made in many diﬀerent ways.
It seems that the property of self-selectivity (as well as resistance to cloning) is much
more compatible with the Condorcet consistent SCFs that with point-scoring ones. It
would be interesting to ﬁnd out whether or not there are any self-selective SCFs in the
class of Condorcet consistent rules.
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Another interesting question that we left open is to characterise all neutral SCCs which
are resistant to cloning of essential alternatives. In particular, we don’t know if T , P and
Ω are the only neutral SCCs with this propertiy.
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